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The Perpetual “Invasion”: Past as
Prologue in Constitutional
Immigration Law
Matthew J. Lindsay*

Donald Trump ascended to the presidency largely on the
promise to protect the American people—their physical and
financial security, their culture and language, even the integrity of
their electoral system—against an invading foreign menace.1 Only
extraordinary defensive measures, including “extreme vetting” of
would-be immigrants, a ban on Muslims entering the United
States, and a 2,000-mile-long wall along the nation’s southern
border could repel the encroaching hordes.2 If candidate Trump’s
scapegoating of unauthorized migrants and refugees was
disarmingly effective, it was also eerily familiar to those of us who
study the history of immigration law and policy. Indeed, the trope
of an immigrant “invasion” has long been a rhetorical mainstay of
American political discourse. Much less well understood, however,
is the extent to which the invasion trope has also shaped the federal
government’s vast, extra-constitutional, and largely unrestrained
authority to exclude or expel noncitizens from the United States.
This Article describes the origin of that authority in the
nativist movements of the late-nineteenth century, including both
the virulent anti-Chinese crusade that culminated in the Chinese
* Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. For their
valuable insight and criticism, I'm grateful to Kim Reilly, and to the
participants in the DePaul College of Law Faculty Seminar.
1. See, e.g., Max Fisher & Amanda Taub, How Donald Trump Hacked
the Politics of Foreign Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/20/world/americas/donald-trump-foreignpolicy.html.
2. See infra notes 96–100 and accompanying text.
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Exclusion Act, and the decades-long and ultimately successful
campaign to severely curtail the immigration of “new” Europeans
from Southern and Eastern Europe. The legacy of this history
endures to the present, as the Supreme Court continues to account
for its broad deference to the political branches on immigration
matters in terms of an inextricable connection between
immigration regulation and the conduct of national security. This
Article concludes by considering whether President Trump’s
unusually candid (unusual, at least, during the last half-century)
deployment of the invasion trope might have an edifying effect on
the Supreme Court in Trump v. Hawaii, the travel ban case, as the
justices contemplate the implications of deferring to a President
whose campaign-season political demagoguery has now mutated to
official United States policy.
*****

In March of 1882, United States Senator John P. Jones of
Nevada sought to correct a dangerous misapprehension about the
nation’s founding principles.3 The authors of the Declaration of
Independence, he instructed, had never “intended to say that all
men of all races were equal.”4 Rather, “free institutions [were] a
monopoly of the favored races,” and none but the “Caucasian race”
had proved “capable of treading freedom’s heights with firm and
unwavering step.”5 Congress adopted the legislation championed
by Senator Jones, the Chinese Exclusion Act, by overwhelming
majorities in both houses.6 Less than three years later, however,
the Caucasian race’s steady march toward “freedom’s heights”
appeared to stall, and Congress was again called upon to secure the
nation against foreign degradation. It was pure folly to believe
“that our advanced and vigorous race [cannot] be . . . deteriorated
by coming in contact with other races or people,” declared
Representative Martin Foran.7 Unless lawmakers took swift
action, a U.S. Senator agreed, “within a brief space dangers as great
as those that have overthrown monarchs and despots may with
ruthless rage assail the institutions of republican freedom.”8 This
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

13 CONG. REC. 1740 (1882).
Id.
Id. at 1742.
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58.
15 CONG. REC. 5351 (1884).
16 CONG. REC. 1624 (1885).
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time, however, it was not the “little brown man,”9 but rather legions
of European “pauper laborers” descending upon the nation’s cities
and factories that impelled Congress to “consider whether it may
not be patriotic and prudent . . . to modify existing views as to the
Declaration of Independence and the universal rights of man.”10
Congress again obliged, and passed the Contract Labor Act of 1885,
prohibiting the admission of European migrants who had embarked
for the United States after having entered into a labor contract with
an American employer.11
Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court bolstered the restrictionist
program by endowing Congress and the Executive with a vast,
extra-constitutional authority to exclude or expel noncitizens from
the United States. As Justice Stephen Field wrote for a unanimous
Court in the 1889 Chinese Exclusion Case, if the nation was to
“preserve its independence, and give security against foreign
aggression and encroachment” from the “vast hordes” of
unassimilable laborers “crowding in upon us,”12 it was essential
that federal policymakers be clothed with a plenary authority that
was beyond the reach of judicially enforceable constitutional
constraints. Field famously dwelled on Chinese immigrants’ social
insularity and uncivilized, servile habits of life and labor.13 They
“remained strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves, and
adhering to the customs and usages of their own country,”14 Field
complained—a failure to assimilate that he attributed to
intractable “differences of race.”15
For Justice Field, as for many late-nineteenth-century jurists
and statesmen, the effects of cheap, servile Chinese labor on
American workers was less a commercial problem than one of
national security—of defending the nation against what he called
the “Oriental invasion.”16 “[I]f . . . the government of the United
States . . . considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in
this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its

9. 13 CONG. REC. 1743 (1882).
10. 16 CONG. REC. 1624 (1885).
11. Contract Labor Act of 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332.
12. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130
U.S. 581, 606 (1889).
13. See id. at 595.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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peace and security,”17 he declared, “their exclusion is not to be
stayed because at the time there are no actual hostilities with the
nation of which the foreigners are subjects.”18 Such a policy,
moreover, was “conclusive upon the judiciary.”19 Although this
wholesale reorganization of federal authority marked a radical
break with historical practice, the Court portrayed the new regime
as a natural concomitant of sovereign nationhood grounded in
timeless principles of international law.20 Three years later, the
Court confirmed that this novel, extra-constitutional federal
immigration power extended beyond the exigencies of Chinese
exclusion, to the nation’s general immigration laws.21 In holding
that a federal immigration inspector’s decision to deny admission
to a Japanese woman was not reviewable in federal court, the Court
set out the formulation of federal authority that would become the
primary rhetorical touchstone for subsequent immigration cases:
It is an accepted maxim of international law that every
sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty,
and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of
foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in
such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to
prescribe. In the United States this power is vested in the
national government, to which the Constitution has
committed the entire control of international relations, in
peace as well as in war.22
As a question of national sovereignty, the Court reasoned, the
decision to deny admission to would-be immigrants had been
consigned exclusively to the “political departments” of the federal

17. Id. at 606.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See id. at 604.
21. See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892).
22. Id. (internal citations omitted). Federal immigration officials had
denied entry to Nishimura Ekiu under a provision of the Immigration Act of
1891 excluding from the United States “persons likely to become a public
charge.” Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084. The 1891 Act
had further assigned exclusive authority to administer the immigration laws,
including the inspection of immigrants, to a national Superintendent of
Immigration lodged within the U.S. Treasury Department, and made final the
decisions of federal inspection officers “touching the right of any alien to land,”
subject to review only by the Superintendent and Treasury Secretary. Id. §§
7–8.
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government.23 It therefore lay beyond “the province of the
judiciary” to order “that foreigners who have never been
naturalized, nor acquired any domicile or residence within the
United States . . . shall be permitted to enter.”24 At least with
respect to non-resident foreigners, “the decisions of executive or
administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by
Congress, are due process of law.”25
Four years later, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States,26 the Court
extended this principle to the expulsion of resident aliens. At issue
was a provision of the Geary Act of 1892, authorizing the arrest and
deportation of any Chinese laborer legally present within the
United States who failed either to obtain a special “certificate of
residence” or, in the alternative, to produce a “credible white
witness” to attest that the laborer had been a resident of the United
States before the adoption of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882.27
A majority of six justices upheld the certificate requirement.28 “The
right to exclude or expel all aliens, or any class of aliens, absolutely
or upon certain conditions, in war or in peace,” the Court declared,
was “an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and
independent nation, essential to its safety, its independence and its
welfare.”29 Accordingly, the constitutional right of due process, “the
right of trial by jury, and prohibiting unreasonable searches and
seizures, and cruel and unusual punishments, have no
application.”30 Three justices, including Stephen Field, lodged
23. Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 659.
24. Id. at 660.
25. Id. The Court did create a narrow opening for procedural review a
decade later when it indicated that administrative officers could not “disregard
the fundamental principles that inhere in ‘due process of law.’” Kaoru
Yamataya v. Fisher (Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 100 (1903).
Although noncitizens’ procedural challenges virtually always failed, the
Japanese Immigrant Case did establish a formal doctrinal foothold for
procedural due process claims that subsequently afforded meaningful, if still
highly deferential, judicial review. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 33
(1982) (holding that a returning alien was entitled to due process in her
exclusion hearing).
26. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
27. See id. at 727. The “credible white witness” alternative to the
certificate of residence was introduced in a rule issued by the Secretary of the
Treasury, who was charged with enforcing the certificate requirement. See id.
at 726–27.
28. See id. at 732.
29. Id. at 711.
30. Id. at 730. The Court has continued to insist on the essentially “civil”
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vigorous dissents.31
Of course, neither nativism nor political movements to restrict
immigration were unique to the late nineteenth century.32
nature of deportation proceedings. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580, 594 (1952) (“Deportation, however severe its consequences, has been
consistently classified as a civil rather than a criminal procedure.”); I.N.S. v.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (“Consistent with the civil nature
of the proceedings, various protections that apply in the context of a criminal
trial do not apply in a deportation hearing.”).
31. See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 732 (Brewer, J., dissenting); id. at 744
(Field, J., dissenting); id. at 761 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting). Both Field and
Justice David Brewer objected that, as persons residing lawfully within the
United States, the petitioners were entitled to the protection of the
Constitution, and that the registration requirement imposed punishment
without due process of law. See id. at 733 (Brewer, J., dissenting); id. at 759
(Field, J., dissenting). Field’s dissent hinged on what he called the “wide and
essential difference” between “legislation for the exclusion of Chinese
persons . . . and legislation for the deportation of those who have acquired a
residence.” Id. at 746. But the author of the Chinese Exclusion Case also made
a point to attack what he viewed as the majority’s improper conflation of alien
friends with alien enemies. See id. at 748. “Aliens from countries at peace
with us,” he explained, “domiciled within our country by its consent, are
entitled to all the guarantees for the protection of their persons and property
which are secured to native-born citizens.” Id. at 754. Justice Brewer went
further, delivering a biting condemnation of the very notion of unrestricted,
extra-constitutional authority:
This doctrine of powers inherent in sovereignty is one both indefinite
and dangerous. Where are the limits to such powers to be found[?] . . .
Is it within legislative capacity to declare the limits? If so, then the
mere assertion of an inherent power creates it, and despotism exists.
May the courts establish the boundaries? Whence do they obtain the
authority for this? . . . The expulsion of a race may be within the
inherent powers of a despotism.
Id. at 737 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
32. Policymakers and charity administrators had long decried European
governments’ alleged “dumping” of their poor into the United States, and
regulators from immigrant-receiving seaboard states acted aggressively to
protect their citizens from the burden of supporting “foreign paupers.” Kunal
M. Parker, State, Citizenship and Territory: The Legal Constructionn of
Immigrants in Antebellum Massachusetts, 19 L. & HIST. REV. 583, 601 (2001);
Hidetaka Hirota, The Moment of Transition: State Officials, the Federal
Government, and the Formation of American Immigration Policy, 99 J. AM.
HIST. 1092, 1098–99 (2013). The southern states excluded “negro seamen” and
other foreign blacks from their territory throughout the antebellum era.
KUNAL M. PARKER, MAKING FOREIGNERS: IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP LAW IN
AMERICA, 1600–2000, at 105–07, 117–18 (2015); Anna O. Law, Lunatics, Idiots,
Paupers, and Negro Seamen—Immigration Federalism and the Early
American State, 28 STUD. AM. POL. DVT. 107, 122–24 (2014); Mary Sarah
Bilder, The Struggle Over Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, and
Articles of Commerce, 61 MO. L. REV. 743, 792–93 (1996). California
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Notwithstanding the long-running, regionally variable ebb and flow
of restrictionist sentiment, however, well into the post-Civil-War
period federal policy was premised on a broad confidence both in
the economic value of immigrants’ labor and, particularly for
Europeans, in their prospects for assimilation.33 So long as
immigrants were properly diffused throughout the nation, the
consensus held, the warm bath of economic freedom, abundant
land, and republican political fellowship would dissolve away the
residue of Old World oppression, infusing newcomers with economic
and political independence, habits of strenuous labor, and devotion
to their adopted nation.34 Throughout this era of relative
confidence, the individual states (under their police power)35 and
the federal government (under Congress’ commerce power)36
governed immigration concurrently, with the balance of authority
shifting gradually toward the latter. And indeed, until the 1880s,
neither the immigrant-receiving seaboard states nor the federal
government inhibited a substantial portion of would-be foreign
migrants.37
In the decades following the Civil War, however, this
confidence in assimilation was shattered by a two-front
immigration “crisis” that contemporaries variably labeled the
“coolie trade” (for Chinese laborers) and the crisis of “foreign pauper

lawmakers sought since the 1850s to bar the entry of additional Chinese
laborers, and lobbied Congress for a federal exclusion law. CHARLES J.
MCCLAIN, IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY: THE CHINESE STRUGGLE AGAINST
DISCRIMINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 10–25 (1994). Finally, antiEuropean nativists had demanded for decades that Congress defend American
democracy against foreign corruption by lengthening the period of residency
required for naturalization.
See Matthew J. Lindsay, Immigration,
Sovereignty, and the Constitution of Foreignness, 45 CONN. L. REV. 743, 764–
65 (2013).
33. See Lindsay, Immigration, Sovereignty, and the Constitution of
Foreignness, supra note 32, at 764.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 747; see also HIDETAKA HIROTA, EXPELLING THE POOR:
ATLANTIC SEABOARD STATES & THE 19TH-CENTURY ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION POLICY (2017) (describing state regulation of foreign “paupers”);
Law, supra note 32 (describing state regulation of the foreign poor, criminals,
diseased, and disabled); Allison Brownell Tirres, Ownership Without
Citizenship: The Creation of Noncitizen Property Rights, 19 MICH. J. RACE & L.
1, 33–40 (2013) (describing state regulation of alien property rights).
36. See Lindsay, Immigration, Sovereignty, and the Constitution of
Foreignness, supra note 32, at 747.
37. See id. at 763–86.
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labor” (for Europeans).38 In contrast to the so-called “foreign
paupers” of the past, whose economic dependency had drawn
periodic attention from lawmakers, charity administrators, and
immigration restrictionists, Chinese “coolies” and European
“pauper laborers” not only labored willfully for a wage; they
competed in the labor market with a vengeance, corrupting that
market precisely through an excess of economic competitiveness.39
Pauper laborers robbed “American” workers of the ability to provide
their families with a “civilized” standard of living, the critique held,
and thereby degraded not only the labor market, but also the
economic “independence” of native workers.40
The “crisis of pauper labor,” as it was called, appeared
fundamentally different, and vastly more consequential for
immigration law and policy, than the various immigration “crises”
identified by earlier generations of restrictionists.41
If left
unchecked, contemporaries worried, wage competition between
American workers and “dependent” foreign laborers would drive a
wedge through the center of postbellum American political
economy, decoupling the citizenly virtues so essential to the
political health of the republic and the economic instrument on
which the industrial order depended—the wage contract.42 As the
California Senate declared in 1877, pauper labor had made “[t]he
vaunted ‘dignity of labor’ . . . a biting sarcasm” and a “burlesque on
the policy of emancipation.”43 The dangers ascribed to foreign
migration had fundamentally changed, and could no longer be
mitigated or managed by restricting access to political
participation. By jeopardizing the living wage—the essential
condition of republican independence in the post-Civil War era—
foreign pauper laborers’ mere presence within the United States
imperiled the health of American citizenship.
Contemporaries might have interpreted the “crisis of pauper
labor” as a referendum on the moral integrity of the industrial wage
system, and thus advocated reforms designed to address structural
economic changes, such as the deskilling of labor and increasingly
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See id. at 794.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
CAL. SEN. REP. OF ITS SPEC. COMM. ON CHINSE IMMIGRATION, CHINESE
IMMIGRATION: SOCIAL, MORAL AND POLITICAL EFFECT 6–7 (1878).
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intense wage competition. And indeed, labor unionists and their
allies did just that.44 Beginning in the late 1870s and early 1880s,
however, legislators, judges, social scientists, and reformers
increasingly understood a worker’s devotion to maintaining an
“American” standard of living, and his refusal to labor for a wage
that could not sustain that standard, as a critical measure of
economic and moral fitness. Accordingly, they diagnosed eroding
standards of living among wage workers less as a fundamental
political-economic problem rooted in the industrial labor system,
than as evidence of the dubious worthiness of foreign laborers
themselves. With remarkable consistency, moreover, they cast
such unworthiness in terms of unskilled laborers’ fundamental,
indelible foreignness, often rendered in the increasingly resonant
language of race. The trope of foreignness thus described not only
the absence of formal citizenship, but a deeper, more elemental
estrangement from the defining political-economic values of postCivil War republican civilization. European and Chinese laborers’
pathological underconsumption—their willingness to work for
starvation wages; their apparent contentment to live in
overcrowded, vermin-infested hovels and to subsist on rotten,
disease-ridden food—was the product of hereditary dispositions
ingrained over centuries.
Through the discourse of indelible foreignness, contemporaries
re-imagined the American polity as a social and political body
whose health depended less on the vitality of its political and
economic institutions than on the collective natural endowments of
its constituent members.
Without the requisite economic
conditions and racial material, they contended, simply immersing
foreign laborers in republican political culture afforded little value
as a force of assimilation. In short, republicans were born, rather
than made. The future of the republic could thus be preserved only
by repelling the foreign menace that threatened to degrade it.
In this context, the invasion trope was more than a stock image
of nativist demagoguery. The passages quoted above from the
Chinese Exclusion Case convey the flavor of that trope as it applied
to the Chinese.45 And indeed, cries of racial invasion permeated

44. William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the
Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 767, 787–88 (1985).
45. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case),
130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889).
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the anti-Chinese crusade as it swept eastward from California in
the late 1870s and early 1880s, from the speeches and petitions of
western politicians and labor leaders; to the editorial pages of
national newspapers and debates in Congress; to the legal
arguments of the Executive branch; and finally, to the decisions of
the Supreme Court.46 As the United States Solicitor General
declared in 1892, it was “generally conceded that the most insidious
and dangerous enemies to the State are not the armed foes who
invade our territory, but those alien races who are incapable of
assimilation, and come among us to debase our labor and poison the
health and morals of the communities in which they locate.”47
Lawmakers deployed the same trope of foreign invasion to
condemn the degradation of American labor and citizenship by the
foreign pauper laborers of Southern and Eastern Europe. They
were “the Goths and Vandals of the modern era,” explained a U.S.
Senator in 1884.48 “They come only to lay waste, to degrade, and to
destroy. They bring with them ignorance, degraded morals, a low
standard of civilization, and no motive to intended American
citizenship.”49 Foreign pauper laborers appeared animated not by
a desire for independence, or self-improvement, or material
comfort, but by raw animal instinct. “Like the vast flights of
grasshoppers and locusts . . . they sweep down upon our fields of
labor to devour and strip from us the benefit of our customs and of
the laws protecting American labor, and they take their flight again
back to the breeding places from which they came.”50 Once again,
this is not merely colorful hyperbole. The invasion trope and the
discourse of indelible foreignness infused the era’s highly successful
immigration restriction campaigns, and underwrote the deeper and
more enduring process of noncitizens’ constitutional estrangement.
Today, more than a century later, federal regulation of
noncitizens remains constitutionally exceptional, outside of and
largely insulated from mainstream constitutional norms. Under
this “plenary power doctrine,” as constitutional immigration law is
conventionally known, federal authority to regulate immigration
46. See, e.g., ANDREW GYORY, CLOSING THE GATE: RACE, POLITICS, AND THE
CHINESE EXCLUSION ACT 261, 270, 277–78, 281 (1998).
47. Brief for the Respondents at 55, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149
U.S. 698 (1893).
48. 15 CONG. REC. 5369 (1884) (statement of Sen. Cutcheon).
49. Id.
50. Id.
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derives not from any enumerated power, but is rather “an incident
of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States.”52
The authority is thus exclusive to the federal government, and its
exercise by Congress or the President is buffered against judicially
enforceable constitutional constraints.53 Critically, the Court
continues to justify the constitutional exceptionalism of
immigration power with reference to the purportedly intricate
connection between immigration regulation and “basic aspects of
national sovereignty, more particularly our foreign relations and
the national security.”54
When a noncitizen encounters governmental authority outside
of the immigration context—for example, as an employee, criminal
defendant, or business licensee—she enjoys the same slate of
constitutional protections as a citizen.55 The moment a court
determines that a federal law or enforcement action qualifies as a
regulation of immigration per se, however, it triggers a
constitutionally exceptional authority, the exercise of which lies
largely beyond the scope of constitutional review.56 This is true
even when the constitutional protection being asserted—for
example, the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause, or the
Equal Protection Clause—makes no distinction between “persons”
and “citizens.”57 Nor does it matter whether the underlying basis
52. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130
U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
53. This is not to suggest that the plenary power doctrine always wholly
immunizes immigration-related federal lawmaking from meaningful
constitutional review. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34–35 (1982)
(recognizing returning non-citizens’ right to due process in exclusion hearings);
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 82–83 (1976) (applying rational basis review to
federal alienage discrimination).
54. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954). See also Demore v. Kim,
538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003) (“[A]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately
interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign
relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of
government.” (citation omitted)).
55. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). See also Wong Wing
v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 233–34, 238 (1896) (striking down on Fifth and
Sixth Amendment grounds a federal statute imposing imprisonment at hard
labor on aliens determined in a summary administrative proceeding to be in
the country illegally).
56. See, e.g., Diaz, 426 U.S. at 81.
57. The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses protect “persons”
without regard to citizenship. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme
Court has long acknowledged as much when reviewing state laws
discriminating on the basis of alienage. See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369
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for removal bears even a colorable connection to foreign affairs or
national security—for example, whether the noncitizen in question
is a suspected terrorist mastermind or a teenage petty criminal.
The consequences for noncitizens are often profound. Long-term
legal residents lack robust constitutional protections against oftenlengthy detention during removal proceedings58 or selection for
removal based on otherwise constitutionally protected speech or
associations.59 Noncitizens outside the United States lack a legal
interest in admission sufficient even to challenge their exclusion;
and on the few occasions that the Court has reviewed a visa
denial—always in cases brought by United States citizens—it has
refused to subject the decision to more than nominal scrutiny.60
(observing that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment were “universal in their application, to all persons
within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of
color, or of nationality”). The First Amendment is framed as a general
restraint on Congress. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The only potentially
meaningful exception is the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, prohibiting the states from “abridg[ing] the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States.” Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
58. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 513.
59. See Reno v. Am. Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491–
92 (1999). Accordingly, scholars and courts alike have long noted the
constitutional exceptionalism of federal immigration regulation, decried the
injustice that it produces, and called for greater constitutional protection for
noncitizens. See, e.g., T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY:
THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 196 (2002); DANIEL
KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 15–20 (2007);
GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND
FUNDAMENTAL LAW 13 (1996); PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND INBETWEENS: ESSAYS ON IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 19 (1998); T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership, and the Constitution, 7 CONST.
COMMENT. 9, 9–10 (1990); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the
Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 255 (1984);
Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625,
1704 (1992).
60. See Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2140 (2015) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (Because the challenged visa denial rested on a “facially legitimate
and bona fide reason,” the Court should “neither look behind the exercise of
that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the
constitutional interests of citizens the visa denial might implicate.” (internal
quotations and citation omitted)); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 793 n.5 (1976)
(The government’s position that “substantive policy regulating the admission
of aliens . . . [is] not an appropriate subject for judicial review” is at odds with
“[o]ur cases reflect[ing] acceptance of a limited judicial responsibility under the
Constitution even with respect to . . . the admission and exclusion of aliens.”);
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) (“The power of congress to

2018]

THE PERPETUAL “INVASION”

381

The Government’s defense of President Trump’s authority to
issue the current travel ban rests squarely on this well-established
(if not entirely consistent) judicial posture of broad deference in
exclusion matters. As the discussion below suggests, both the
Government and the justices tend to avoid even citing the original
plenary power decisions, preferring to rely instead on a series of
staunchly deferential exclusion and deportation cases decided in
the 1950s, in which international communism rather than racial
invasion loomed as the foremost threat to national sovereignty and
security.61 And indeed, over the course of the twentieth century, as
the overt nativism and racism that animated the Chinese Exclusion
Case and Fong Yue Ting faded from both federal immigration law
and respectable political and judicial discourse, the trope of
immigrant invasion likewise disappeared from the Court’s
immigration decisions and the Government’s briefs.62 Of course,
exclude aliens altogether from the United States, or to prescribe the terms and
conditions upon which they may come to this country, and to have its declared
policy . . . enforced exclusively through executive officers, without judicial
intervention, is settled by our previous adjudications.” (quoting Lem Moon
Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895))); United States ex rel. Knauff
v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (“Whatever the procedure authorized
by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”
(citations omitted)).
61. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531–32 (1954) (upholding
deportation of long-term legal resident based on past membership in
Communist Party); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,
215–16 (1953) (upholding exclusion and indefinite detention of noncitizen on
Ellis Island without a hearing); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 591
(1952) (upholding deportation of long-term legal resident based on past
membership in Communist Party); Knauff, 338 U.S. at 546–47 (upholding
exclusion of noncitizen wife of an American citizen, without a hearing and on
the basis of secret evidence). In fact, the national security cases of the Cold
War era are notable today for their failure to command anything approaching
judicial consensus about the metes and bounds of the federal immigration
power. See Matthew J. Lindsay, Disaggregating “Immigration Law,” 68 FLA.
L. REV. 179, 219–24 (2016).
62. For the past half-century, in particular, federal law governing
eligibility for admission to the United States has generally reflected the more
pluralistic, inclusive dimension of the national heritage. The civil rights
revolution arrived in immigration law in 1965, when Congress finally
eliminated the seven-decades-long near-total exclusion of immigrants from the
so-called Asian-Pacific triangle and abandoned a National Origins Quota
system that had severely restricted immigration from other countries outside
of western and northern Europe since the 1920s. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-236, sec. 1, § 201(e), sec. 2, § 201(a)–(b), 79 Stat. 911–912; see generally
Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A
New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273
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neither is obliged to acknowledge the overwrought nativism that
marked the origins of plenary power, and one might even interpret
the omission of the foundational anti-Chinese cases as a sign of
“progress.” Yet that omission is also an act of historical forgetting,
the necessary consequence of which is to obscure the vision of racial
invasion that nourished and animated the plenary power doctrine
at its inception. This is particularly relevant when the Government
claims, as it typically does, that the challenged regulation
implicates foreign affairs and national security.63 One contention
of this Article is that President Trump’s unapologetic scapegoating
of noncitizens has made newly visible the tropes of racial invasion
and existential threat embedded in the federal immigration power
more than a century ago—a theme I return to below.
First, however, consider the extent to which the Government’s
defense of the travel ban relies on a claim of virtually unfettered,
constitutionally exceptional authority.64 “‘The exclusion of aliens is
a fundamental act of sovereignty’ that the Constitution entrusts to
the political branches,”65 the Government argues—a sovereign
right that “stems not alone from the legislative power but is
inherent in the executive power to control the foreign affairs of the
nation”66 and is “largely immune from judicial inquiry or
interference.”67 The wide breadth of executive judgement and
discretion is embodied in the “fundamental and longstanding”
(1996).
63. It likewise suppresses consideration of why a body of federal law that
is overwhelmingly concerned with ordinary matters of labor, crime, and access
to public services, should be “conclusive upon the judiciary”—that is, why a
regulatory domain dominated by patently unexceptional subject matter has
been consigned to the “political branches,” where the government’s conduct is
buffered against constitutional review.
See Lindsay, Disaggregating
“Immigration Law,” supra note 61.
64. At the time of this writing, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari
for the challenge to EO-3, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923, 923 (2018), but the
Government has not yet submitted its brief on the merits. The following
discussion thus relies on the Government’s August 2017 Brief to the Court
defending EO-2, and the Government’s Petition for Certiorari in the current
challenge to EO-3. See Brief for the Petitioners, Trump v. Int’l Refugee
Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (Nos. 16-1436 and 16-1540) (filed Aug. 10,
2017); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923 (No. 17-965) (filed
Jan. 5, 2018).
65. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 64, at 23 (quoting Knauff, 338
U.S. at 542).
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952)); see
also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 64, at 27.
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principle of “consular nonreviewability.”68 That principle applies
“regardless of the manner in which the Executive decides to deny
entry to an alien abroad”69 and, the Government argues, buffers
President Trump’s Proclamation against judicial review, making
the challengers’ statutory claims nonjusticiable and their
Establishment Clause claim subject only to “minimal scrutiny.”70
I focus here on the Government’s constitutional arguments,
because that is where President Trump’s unabashed nativist
demagoguery may bear most directly on the justices’ willingness to
scrutinize the Proclamation’s asserted rationale.71
The
Government and the challengers agree with both the Fourth and
Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal that, under established precedent,
a court will uphold an exclusion order against constitutional
challenge so long as the Government provides a “facially legitimate

68. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 64, at 24.
69. Id. at 25.
70. See id.
71. With respect to the nonjusticiability of the challengers’ statutory
claims, the Government insists that “the denial or revocation of a visa for an
alien abroad ‘is not subject to judicial review’” absent “affirmative
authorization” by Congress. Id. at 24. This presumption of nonreviewability,
and of the President’s wide latitude in questions of exclusion more generally,
also directly inform the Government’s argument that § 1182(f) of the INA,
authorizing the President to “suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of
aliens” whose entry he “finds . . . would be detrimental to the interests of the
United States,” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), confers a “sweeping proclamation power”
that the President may wield unfettered either by the Establishment Clause
or the INA’s prohibition against nationality-based discrimination in the
issuance of visas. See id. at 40. Section 1152(a)(1)(A) of the INA provides:
“[N]o person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated
against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex,
nationality, place of birth, or place or residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1152. Congress
added that nondiscrimination provision in the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1965—thirteen years after the adoption of § 1182(f) in the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, sec. 2,
§ 201(a), 79 Stat. 9112. “Congress placed no restrictions on which ‘interests’
count or what ‘detriment[s]’ suffice for the President to invoke his suspension
authority, committing all of those matters to the President’s judgment and
discretion,” the Government argues. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 64,
at 41. Judicial deference is “especially warranted,” moreover, because a
President’s determinations to “suspend the entry of aliens . . . directly
implicate his foreign-affairs and national-security powers”—a domain of
presidential authority in which courts are “utterly unable to assess” the
“adequacy” and “authenticity” of his reasons. Id. at 42. In short, the
President’s judgment with respect to the exclusion of noncitizens is “not subject
to review.” Id. at 42.
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and bona fide reason.”72 That is a very low bar; just how low,
however, is a critical subject of dispute. The Court’s last word on
the issue, the 2015 case of Kerry v. Din, sheds the most light on the
disputed meaning of that phrase, and thus on the current justices’
disposition toward presidential claims of unfettered discretion to
exclude noncitizens.73 In Din, a five-justice majority rejected
United States citizen Fauzia Din’s due process challenge to the
exclusion of her noncitizen husband, Kanishka Berashk, on
unspecified “national security” grounds.74 The opinion for the
Court, which represented the views of only three justices, endorsed
the Government’s claim of “consular absolutism”—the notion that
there is no right to judicial review of a rejected visa application,
even when the plaintiff is a U.S. citizen.75 Justice Breyer’s
dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan, rejected consular absolutism and concluded
that the Government’s bare citation to the statutory provision
under which Berashk was excluded, while refusing to reveal the
specific factual basis for the denial, did not constitute due process
of law.76 Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, which was joined
72. Id. at 62.
73. 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015). Eight of the nine current justices participated
in Din. Justice Gorsuch had not yet joined the Court.
74. Id. at 2141.
75. The opinion for the Court was written by Justice Scalia, who has since
been succeeded by Justice Gorsuch, and joined by Justice Thomas and Chief
Justice Roberts. Id. at 2131.
76. Justice Breyer’s dissent upholds a long tradition of vigorous judicial
protest against the Court’s reflexive deference in immigration matters. See
Lindsay, Disaggregating “Immigration Law,” supra note 61, at 215–24. That
history began with Justice Field and Brewer’s withering condemnation
in Fong Yue Ting v. United States of the “indefinite and dangerous” doctrine of
“powers inherent in sovereignty.” 149 U.S. 698, 737 (1893) (Brewer, J.,
dissenting). It continued with Justice Douglas and Black’s powerful dissents
in Cold War-era cases such as United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,
338 U.S. 537, 550–52 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting) and Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 217–18 (1953) (Black, J., dissenting).
In Mezei, Black compared the Attorney General’s “unreviewable discretion”
under the plenary power doctrine with the arbitrary ruthlessness of twentiethcentury Europe’s most infamous authoritarians. See id. This sentiment
endures in modern opinions such as Justice Souter’s forceful four-justice
dissent in Demore v. Kim, insisting that “the basic liberty from physical
confinement at the heart of due process” demands that the government prove
a “sufficiently compelling” reason before it can “lock away” a removable
noncitizen. 538 U.S. 510, 541, 549, 551 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting);
Although Justice Breyer’s dissent in Kerry v. Din is more restrained in both
tone and substance, his insistence that the denial of a noncitizen’s visa
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by Justice Alito, provided the fourth and fifth votes upholding the
exclusion, and was therefore controlling.77 Kennedy, like the four
dissenters, rejected consular absolutism, but nevertheless
concluded that merely by citing the INA’s so-called “terrorism
bar”—a complex provision containing dozens of distinct reasons for
denying a visa application78—the Government had provided a
facially legitimate bona fide reason for Berashk’s exclusion, and
thereby satisfied the requirement of due process.79
Justice Kennedy’s position in Kerry v. Din—his
acknowledgement that a U.S. citizen-petitioner can have a
judicially reviewable constitutional interest in the exclusion of a
noncitizen, paired with a highly deferential posture toward the
Government’s asserted reason for that exclusion80—suggests that,
of all the members of the Din majority who remain on the Court, he
is perhaps most primed for edification regarding the newly manifest
perils of perfunctory judicial review in exclusion cases. At first
blush, it is difficult to conceive how Kennedy, who has a deserved
reputation as a defender of constitutional liberty, could have
concluded in good faith that merely gesturing to a wide-ranging
statutory assortment of possible reasons for denying a visa
application provides meaningful protection against arbitrary or
otherwise improper governmental conduct—the essence of
constitutional due process. And indeed, in virtually any context
other than immigration, such judicial “review” would appear little
more than an empty gesture to the rule of law. Viewed in the
context of the Court’s immigration jurisprudence, however,
Kennedy’s position becomes, if not persuasive, at least intelligible.
Like the Government’s argument in Trump v. Hawaii,81 Kennedy’s
concurrence in Din82 relies heavily on the 1972 case Kleindienst v.

application interferes with a constitutional liberty interest (albeit that of the
noncitizen applicant’s American spouse, rather than the noncitizen himself),
and that such interference warrants “individualized adjudication,” including
the “ordinary application of Due Process Clause procedures,” resonates with
longstanding pleas both on and off the court to end to immigration law’s
century-long constitutional exile. See Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2144 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
77. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2139–41 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
78. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (2012).
79. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2139–41 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 64, at 18.
82. 135 S. Ct. at 2139–41 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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Mandel.83 There, the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional
challenge to the Government’s exclusion of Ernest Mandel, a
Belgian journalist, scholar, and self-described “revolutionary
Marxist,”84 on the ground that, during a previous visit to the United
States, Mandel had failed to “conform to his itinerary and limit his
activities to the stated purposes of his trip.”85 The Court
acknowledged that Mandel’s exclusion implicated the petitioners’
(American scholars who had invited Mandel to an academic
conference in the United States) First Amendment right to hear
him speak, but declined to approach the Government’s proffered
reason skeptically, and to inquire whether it was mere pretext for
the real reason for Mandel’s exclusion—namely, disapproval of his
ideas.86
As far as Justice Kennedy was concerned, the “reasoning and
holding in Mandel control[ed]” in Din.87 So long as a visa denial
that burdened the constitutional interest of a U.S. citizen rested on
a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason,” Kennedy wrote, quoting
from Mandel, “‘courts will neither look behind the exercise of that
discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against’ the
constitutional interests of citizens the visa denial might
implicate”—an act of judicial deference that had “particular force in
the area of national security.”88 “Given Congress’ plenary power to
‘suppl[y] the conditions of the privilege of entry into the United
States,’” he reasoned, “it follows that the Government’s decision to
exclude an alien it determines does not satisfy one or more of those
conditions is facially legitimate under Mandel.”89
Yet Kennedy must have realized that to sanction the opacity of
the Government’s decision to exclude Berashk even while
acknowledging Din’s constitutional interest in the integrity of that
decision requires more than a straightforward application of
Mandel.
Notwithstanding the Mandel Court’s forthright
affirmation of the plenary power doctrine and its refusal to “look
behind” the Government’s asserted reason for Mandel’s exclusion,90
83. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
84. Id. at 756.
85. Id. at 758.
86. Id. at 768–69.
87. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2140 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 2140 (quoting Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770).
89. Id. at 2140 (quoting United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338
U.S. 537, 542, 543 (1950)).
90. See Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770.
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the Government had in fact provided the citizen-petitioners in that
case with substantially more “process” than Kennedy requires in
Din.91 Critically, the Government had informed Mandel of the
concrete facts that purportedly led to his visa denial—specifically,
his failure to comply with the “conditions and limitations attached
to his [prior] visa issuance.”92 Kennedy evades this critical
distinction by pointing to the “discrete factual predicates”
enumerated in the statute under which Berashk’s visa application
was denied.93 This is a slight-of-hand that evacuates the right to
due process of anything resembling individualized consideration.
In this respect, Kennedy’s opinion more closely resembles the
Court’s pre-Warren-era exclusion decisions, which all but
acknowledged that constitutional due process in immigration
proceedings was an empty shell.94 In short, Kennedy assumes that
91. 135 S. Ct. at 2141 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
92. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 758–59.
93. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2140 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
94. Consider Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), which
is generally credited with creating a narrow opening for procedural review
(which the Chinese Exclusion Case and Fong Yue Ting had appeared to bar).
189 U.S. 86 (1903). Notwithstanding the political departments’ broad
authority to exclude or expel aliens, the Court reasoned, administrative officers
“may [not] disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in due process of
law.” Id. at 100. While such language may appear to stake out for the Court
a meaningful role in insuring procedural fairness, the actual outcome
of Yamataya tells a very different story. Yamataya, a Japanese woman, had
been excluded from the United States based on a federal immigration
inspector’s finding that she was “likely to become a public charge.” Id. at 87.
Yamataya appealed, claiming that she had not been afforded a meaningful
opportunity to challenge the inspector’s decision. The Court acknowledged
that the petitioner lacked “knowledge of our language; that she did not
understand the nature and import of the questions propounded to her; that the
investigation made was a ‘pretended’ one; and that she did not, at the time,
know that the investigation had reference to her being deported from the
country,” but nevertheless concluded that such personal “misfortune . . .
constitutes no reason . . . under any rule of law, for the intervention of the
court.” Id. at 101–02. Or consider Knauff, in which the Court upheld the
exclusion of Ellen Knauff, the German wife of an American citizen, without a
hearing and on the basis of secret evidence. 338 U.S. 537, 539, 547 (1950).
“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is,” the Court famously
declared, “it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.” Id. at
544 (citations omitted). Knauff presented such a sympathetic figure, and her
plight was considered such a travesty of justice, that the Attorney General
(after considerable prodding from Congress) eventually granted her a full
exclusion hearing. That hearing ultimately resulted in her admission to the
United States as a permanent resident after it was determined that her
exclusion as a national security risk had been based on “unsubstantiated
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Din held a protected liberty interest in the Government’s
consideration of her husband’s visa application, yet denies that that
interest entitled either her or Berashk to any information that
would enable them to comprehend, let alone challenge, the reasons
for his exclusion.95
What, if anything, does Justice Kennedy’s controlling opinion
in Din suggest about his disposition in Trump v. Hawaii? Once one
grants, as Kennedy did in Din, that the Government’s exclusion of
a noncitizen can impair the constitutional rights of citizens and
legal residents, such extraordinary deference is comprehensible
only where there is no obvious reason to doubt that the Government
has acted in good faith. And then came Donald Trump. For the
past two years, Donald Trump—first as a candidate, then as
President—has offered spectacular proof that the invasion
metaphor continues to resonate with many Americans.96 He
announced his candidacy with lurid images Mexican drug dealers
and rapists pouring into the country97—a problem that could only
be solved, he insisted, by constructing a “great wall on our southern
border.”98 Then came the flood of Islamic terrorists posing as
refugees of the Syrian civil war. His solution? A “total and
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.”99 Nor
was this simply election-season hyperbole uttered spontaneously
during the fervor of a campaign rally, but rather a considered
hearsay.” Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens:
Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
933, 958–64 (1995).
95. See Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2139 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
96. Both the challengers and the Fourth Circuit detail this history at
length in support of their Establishment Clause analyses. See Int’l Refugee
Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 594–600 (4th Cir. 2017); Brief in
Opposition at 2–8, Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080
(2017) (No. 16-1436).
97. Donald Trump stated: “When Mexico sends its people, they’re not
sending their best. They’re not sending you . . . . They’re sending people that
have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re
bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists.” Full Text: Donald
Trump Announces a Presidential Bid, WASH. POST (June 16, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/06/16/full-textdonald-trump-announces-a-presedential-bid/?utm_term=.2clab2c28407.
98. Id.
99. Jenna Johnson, Trump Calls for “total and complete shutdown of
Muslims entering the United States,” WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2015),
https://washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/12/07/donald-trumpcalls-for-total-and-complete-shutdown-of-muslims-entering-the-unitedstates/?utm_terms=.bfbf614a81fb (quoting Trump Campaign press release).
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position set forth in a formal “Statement on Preventing Muslim
Immigration” that was featured on Trump’s campaign website for
a year-and-a-half, including during the first five months of his
presidency.100 In short, Trump promised voters that he alone could
repel the invasion of the United States by foreign terrorists and
other criminals, and they responded. Then, all of seven days into
his presidency, he made good on his promise by issuing the first of
three successive orders banning migrants from several
predominantly Muslim countries from entering the United
States.101 That order was soon replaced by a second,102 and then,
nearly six months later, by the third and current iteration,103 which
indefinitely prohibits travel to the United States by citizens of six
majority-Muslim countries (Chad, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and
Yemen) and North Korea.104
Both the challengers and the Fourth and Ninth Circuits grant
that the Government possesses plenary federal power to exclude
noncitizens, but insist that such power “is not tantamount to a
Constitutional blank check.”105 Even Mandel and Din do not
“completely insulate [exclusion] decisions from any meaningful
review.”106 Rather, the “bona fide” requirement107 conditions the
“longstanding principle of deference to the political branches”108 on
100. “Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration” was posted on
Trump’s website on December 7, 2015. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857
F.3d at 594. Notably, the Statement was taken down in early May 2018, five
months after Trump’s inauguration as President and shortly before oral
argument before the Fourth Circuit on EO-2. Brief in Opposition, supra note
96, at 25 n.15.
101. Exec. Order No. 13769, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist
Entry into the United States, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977, 8978 (Jan. 27, 2017).
102. Exec. Order No. 13780, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist
Entry into United States, 82 Fed. Reg. 13202 (Mar. 6, 2017).
103. Proclamation No. 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes
for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other
Public-Safety Threats, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017).
104. Id. at 45165–67.
105. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 590; see Hawaii v. Trump,
878 F.3d 662, 679 (9th Cir. 2017); Brief in Opposition, supra note 96, at 46.
106. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 590; see also Hawaii, 878
F.3d at 679 (“Although the political branches’ power to exclude aliens is ‘largely
immune from judicial control,’ it is not entirely immune . . . . Moreover, this
case is not about individual visa denials, but instead concerns the ‘President’s
promulgation of sweeping immigration policy.’” (internal citations omitted)).
107. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 589 (citing Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972)).
108. Id. (citing Mandel, 408 U.S. at 767).
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the Government’s “good faith.”109 As the Fourth Circuit explains,
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Din established “that where a
plaintiff makes ‘an affirmative showing of bad faith’ that is
‘plausibly alleged with sufficient particularity,’ courts may ‘look
behind’ the challenged action to assess its ‘facially legitimate’
justification.”110 Accordingly, the court reads Kennedy’s opinion
not as an injunction against judicial scrutiny, but rather “to require
that we step away from our deferential posture and look behind the
stated reason for the challenged action.”111 Once authorized to
“look behind” the national security rationale set forth in the
Proclamation, to candidate and President Trump’s extensive record
of anti-Muslim statements (including his candid characterizations
of the first travel ban as a “Muslim ban”112) the Fourth Circuit had
little difficulty concluding that EO-2’s “stated national security
interest was provided in bad faith, as a pretext for its [anti-Muslim]
purpose.”113
Justice Kennedy may well find that analysis
persuasive. After all, if, as the Government maintains, the
abundant, highly public evidence of President Trump’s anti-Muslim
demagoguery counts for nothing, it is difficult to view the
circumscribed judicial “review” that Kennedy endorsed in Din as
anything but an empty formalism. If he is prepared to affirm that
it is not an empty formalism, and to inquire whether the
Government’s “facially neutral” reason for banning 150 million
people from entering the United States is mere pretext for religious
discrimination, it is entirely possible to strike down the travel ban
on constitutional grounds without dismantling the plenary power
doctrine.
I want to propose, however, that when we view President
Trump’s nativist bombast in light of the 120-year history of
constitutional exceptionalism in immigration matters, it suggests
still more far-reaching implications. As this Article explained
above, in the late nineteenth century the Supreme Court translated
the political trope of indelible foreignness into a potent and durable
rationale for extra-constitutional authority, forging the
immigration power into an instrument of national “self109. Id. at 590–91 (citing Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
110. Id. (quoting Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2141 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
111. Id. at 591.
112. Id. at 575.
113. Id. at 592.
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preservation” to be deployed against invading armies of racially
degraded, economically and politically unassimilable foreigners.114
Even today, generations after the United States abandoned
Chinese exclusion and national origins quotas, immigrants’
constitutional estrangement—the principle that foreignness per se
rightly dictates the nature of the authority to which they are
subject—remains an axiomatic feature of the federal immigration
power. For modern judicial and scholarly defenders of immigration
exceptionalism, the indecorous rhetoric that clutters the historical
origins of the plenary power doctrine does not diminish its legal
soundness and continued legitimacy. Once we strip away the
Court’s racism and the overwrought metaphor of alien invasion, the
argument runs, the Government’s inherent power to control the
admission and expulsion of non-citizens remains, as a logical
concomitant of national sovereignty. After all, outside of the
Naturalization Clause the Constitution is silent on the federal
government’s power to regulate immigration; but such authority
must exist somewhere.115
Yet as I have argued, the invasion trope was not merely
anachronistic dicta; rather, it enabled the Court to bridge the
gaping chasm between its novel legal rationale for federal authority
and the decidedly quotidian purpose and subject matter of most
immigration lawmaking and enforcement.
It was precisely
immigrants’ fundamental, indelible foreignness—their racial
difference, their inability to assimilate, their destructive effect on
American citizenship—that gave substance to the metaphor of
racial invasion, and thus to the analogy between immigration
regulation and war. Indeed, the tropes of invasion and war conjure
Congress’s Article I authority to “repel [i]nvasions”116 and “declare
[w]ar”117 without strictly invoking them, and thereby also summon
the tradition of judicial deference toward those archetypal
“political” powers. The Court’s declared objective of national self-

114. See supra notes 12–31 and accompanying text.
115. It bears noting that even if one concedes that the principle of
territorial sovereignty implies an authority to govern the rights of noncitizens
to enter into and remain within territory, it does not follow that such authority
must be exercised beyond the reach of mainstream constitutional norms, and
that noncitizens must be denied important constitutional rights to which they,
as persons, would otherwise be entitled.
116. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 15.
117. Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11.
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preservation against invading foreign races cannot, therefore, be
swept aside like some unseemly rhetorical debris from a bygone era,
cluttering the logically sound foundation of immigration
exceptionalism.
Rather,
President
Trump’s
nativist
demagoguery—his disarmingly unapologetic scapegoating of
unauthorized migrants, refugees, and many would-be
immigrants—makes newly visible plenary power’s long-obscured
premises. President Trump reminds us, in short, that the trope of
alien invasion remains the cornerstone of the entire legal edifice.118
As apprehensive as many of us are about the Court’s review
this spring of the President’s Proclamation, the case does offer the
justices a rare opportunity to consider the plenary power doctrine
in its most honest, unvarnished form. Might the bizarre tableau of
the travel ban, especially the President’s remarkable public
statements referring to it as a “Muslim ban,” and cynically
acknowledging that its ostensible focus on nations rather than
religion is a fig leaf, cause them to think more critically than they
have in the past about the Government’s rote invocation of national
security? One can hope.

118. See Lindsay, Immigration, Sovereignty, and the Constitution of
Foreignness, supra note 32, at 812.

